- "The exoteric teaching of the Kantian philosophy--that the
understanding ought not to go beyond experience, else the cognitive
faculty will become a theoretical reason which by itself generates
nothing but fantasies of the brain--this was a justification from
a philosophical quarter for the renunciation of speculative thought...
For skill in public and private life, practice and practical training
generally were essential ans alone necessary, theoretical insight
being harmful even. Philosophy and ordinary common sense thus cooperating
to bring about the downfall of metaphysics, there was seen the strange
spectacle of a cultured nation without metaphysics--like a temple
richly ornamented in other respects but without a holiest of holies.
Theology, which in former times was the guardian of the speculative
mysteries and of metaphysics... had given up this science in exchange
for feelings, for what was popularly matter-of-fact, and for historical
erudition. In keeping with this change, there vanished from the
world those solitary souls who were sacrificed by their people and
exiled from the world to the end that the eternal should be contemplated
and served by lives devoted solely thereto--not for any practical
gain but for the sake of blessedness... So that having got rid
of the dark utterances of metaphysics, of the colourless comunion
of the spirit with itself, outer existence seemed to be transformed
into the bright world of flowers--and there are no black flowers,
as we know." (26-7).
- "Consciousness is spirit as a concrete knowing, a knowing too,
in which externality is involved..."(28)
- he's admitting the idea of knowing a thing within the realm of appearance
is a form of knowlege, but his aim is to demonstrate that one can
know the object as it is in itself...
- "In the Phenomenology of the Spirit I have exhibited
consciousness in its movement onwards from the first immediate opposition
fo itself and the object to absolute knowlege..." (48) [hmmm.
Looks like that should be next on the list... I better get busy. Just
added 1500 pages of Hegel to the list...] and later: "Phenomenology
of the spirit is the science (exposition) of consciousness and has
for result the Notion of science, i.e. pure knowing. Logic, then,
has for its presupposition the science of manifested spirit, which
contains the necessity, and so the truth, of the standpoint occupied
by pure knowing and if its mediation. In this science of manifested
spirit the beginning is made frim empirical, sensuous consciousness
and this is immediate knowlege..." (68-9)
- "The critical philosophy has already turned metaphysics into
logic... and were left with the residue of a thing-in-itself, an infinite
obstacle, as a beyond.... ...that they be considered... as logic,
as pure reason" paraphrase: Logic is pure reason apart from any
concern with objects of thought. Reason stands above objectivity?
- Aims for a total reconstruction of Logic from the Aristotilian.
- "The negative is just as much positive, or that what is self-contradictory
does not resolve itself into a nullity, into an abstract nothingness,
but essentially only into the negation of its particular content,
in other words, that such a negation is not all and every negation
but the negation of a specific subject matter... Because the result
is a specific negation it thus has content." (54)
- Kant showed dialectic had a necessary function of reason.
- "The essential requirement for the science of logic is not
so much that the beginning be a pure immediacy, but rather that the
whole of the science be within itself a circle in which the first
is also the last and the last is also the first." (71) [dude,
circles are beginningless and endless; furthermore you're grounding
your science on tautology?]
- plays with himself for several pages regarding "being"
"empty being" and other such horseshit. In any case, logic
begins with being.
...on page 82!!!
[I see what Derrida was saying about the
- "Being, pure being, without any further determination. In its
indeterminate immediacy it is equal only to itself. It is also not
unequal relatively to an other; it has no diversity within itself
nor any with a reference outwards... It is pure indeterminance and
Emptiness... only this empty thinking... in fact nothing, and
neither more nor less than nothing. " (82. "first"
- pure being and pure nothing are identical. "their truth is,
therefore, this movement of the immediate vanishing of one into the
other; becoming, both are distiguished [where? by whom?] but by a
difference which has equally immediately resolved itself."(83)
- "As we know, in the oriental systems, principly
in Buddhism, nothing, the void, is the absolute principle.
Against that simple and one sided abstraction [dude, fine, you picked
the fight...] the deep-thinking Heraclitus brought forward the higher,
total concept of becoming and said: being as little is,
as nothing is, or all flows, which means, all is becoming.
The popular, especially oriental proverbs, that all that exists has
the germ of death in its very birth, that at death, on the other hand,
is the entrance into new life, express at bottom the same union of
being and nothing. But these expressions have a substratum in which
the transition takes place; being and nothing are held apart in time,
are concieved as alternating in it, but are not thought in their abstraction
and consequently, too, not so that they are in themselves absolutely
the same." (83-4) [you are fuct dude...]
- being and nothing are identical in indeterminate (abstract) but
not determinate propositions.
- "[Being and Nothing's] difference is therefore completely
empty, each of them is in the same way indeterminate; the difference,
then, exists not in themselves but in a third, in subjective opinion."(92)
- "The unity, whose moments, being and nothing, are inseperable,
is at the same time different from them and is thus a third to them;
this third in its most characteristic form is becoming."
- Citing Jacobi, F.H. Works, Vol III, p. 113: "For a time
I must try clean to forget that I ever saw, heard, touched or handled
anything at all, myself expressly not excepted. Clean, clean,
clean must I forget all movement, and precisely this forgetting,
because it is hardest, I must make my greatest concern... retaining
nothing but the forcibly arrested intuition alone of infinite immutable
space... I must wholly pass over into it, become one with
it, transform myself into it; I must leave nothing over of myself
but this my intuition itself, in order to contemplate it as
a genuinely self-subsistant, independant, single and sole conception."
- ... and then in the next paragraph, "With this wholly abstract
purity of continuity, that is, indeterminateness and vacuity of conception,
it is indifferent whether this abstraction is called space, pure intuiting,
or pure thinkingl it is altugether the same as what the Indian
calls Brahma, when for years on end, physically motionless and
equally unmoved in sensation, conception, fantasy, desire and so on,
he says inwardly only Om, Om, Om, or else nothing at all. this
dull, empty consciousness, understood as consciousness,
- ref: chinese philosophy begins with nothing, 99.
- if being and nothing are separate, then becoming is incomprehensible,
for how can what is nothing produce being? by what device? Yet,
what "be", that which is being, has already begun...
If being and nothing are identical and not contrary, then movement
between them is possible by the device of becoming.
- Dialectic Defined: "This style of reasoning which makes
and clings to the false presupposition of the absolute separateness
of being and non-being is to be named not dialectic, but sophistry.
For sophistry is an argument proceeding from a baseless proposition
uncritically and unthinkingly adopted: but we call dialectic the
higher movement of reason in which such seemingly utterly separate
terms pass over into each other spontaneously, through that which
they are, a movement in which the presupposition sublates itself.
It is the dialectical [ly?] immanent nature of being and nothing themselves
to manifest their unity, that is, becoming, as their truth."
(105) (sic.? I can't see how this sentence can work.)
- "Becoming is the unseparatedness of being and nothing, not
the unity which abstracts from being and nothing." (105)
- Coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be are the respective directions of
becoming for nothing and being respectively.
- "What is sublated is at the same time preserved;
it has only lost its immediacy but is not on that account annihilated...
Something is sublated only in so far as it has entered into unity
with its opposite." (107)
okay, chew on this, " ..." no on second
thought, don't; "the treatment of determineate being falls therefore
into three parts:
- Determinate being as such
- Something and Other; finitude
- Qualitative infinity (109)
In summary, being is determined by quality, quality defines "something"
as opposed to "other," and negatively as "other"
than itself (non-identical), which in turn give birth to being-for-self,
- this stuff reads like cosmology. If you were to substitute proper
names for "determinate being" and "being' and something
and other... what would you get?
Shiva (Determinate Being) in general
From Kundalini (becoming) there issues Sushumna (determinate
being). which is simple oneness of Ida (being)
and Pingala (nothing)... Because of this oneness it has the
form of Shakti (immediacy). Its mediation, Kundalini,
lies behind it; it has sublated itself and Shiva appears, [dude
it just flashed. There's a traditional story about shiva where
Mara or someone tries to poison the world, and shiva drinks the
poison to save the world, and someone I guess Kali maybe, CHOKES
him, thus preventing him from swallowing the poison and dying...
This is an image of the "throat lock," uh, moola bandha,
udyana bandha, uh... the other one... anyway] therefore, as a first,
as a starting point for the ensuing development. It is first
of all in the one-sided determination of Ida, the other determination,
pingala, will likewise display itself and in contrast to it... (109)
- "Quality, taken in the distinct character of being, is
reality; as burdened with a negative it is negation
in general, likewise a quality but one which counts as a deficiency,
and which further on is determined as limit, limitation.
Both are determinate being, but in reality as quality with the
accent on being, the fact is concealed that it contains determinateness
and therefore also negation." (111)
- "da-sein" or "there-being" or "being which
is there" herein translated as Determinate Being....
- "Reality is quality, dasein, determinate being; consequently
contains the moment of the negative... Reality, taken as we are supposed
to take it, in the so-called eminent sense or as infinite--the usual
meaning of the word--is expanded into indeterminateness and loses its
- "Negation stands directly opposed to reality: further on, in
the special sphere of reflected determinations, it becomes opposed to
the positive, which is reality reflecting the negation--the reality
in which the negative has an illusory being [scheint], the negative
which in reality is still hidden." (114)
- reality and negation are thus opposed as "determinateness and
determination." Negation is negated by the Notion of Something.
Whereas the two are equally void and sublated. Negation is affirmatively
present in their opposition.
- "The negative of the negative is, as something, only the
beginning of the subject.[Subjekt]--being within itself, only as yet,
quite indeterminate" (115)
- "Something and Other are, in the first place, both determinate
beings, or somethings. Secondly, each is equally an Other...
The entire determinateness falls into this external pointing out; even
the expression 'this' contains no distinction... By 'this' we mean
to express something completely determined; it is overlooked that speech,
as a work of the understanding, gives expression only to Universals,
except in the name of a single opject; but the individual name
is meaningless, in the sense that it does not express a universal, and
for the same reason appears as something merely posited and arbitrary..."
- other is not other on its own account, but only from reference of
a Third. However [curiously] Other is to be taken as in relation
to itself, abstractly. "It is, therefore, that which is absolutely
dissimilar within itself, that which negates itself, alters itself.
But in so doing it remains identical with itself, for that into which
it alters is the Other, and this is its sole determination." (118)
- "Something" is only being-for-Other; Otherness is
contained it it, but separate; Something stands only in relation to
its other. "Something" is also self-identical in opposition
to its Other, and as such is Being-In-Itself. These are the two
moments (think physics when we say moments, as points of force in a
system, along a beam, a fulcrum, etc.) of the "Something."
- Being and nothing, in their unity, determinate being [dasein], are
no longer being and nothing--these they are only outside their unity--in
becoming (their unstable unity) they are coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.
The being in something is being-in-itself. Being (self-relation)
is no longer immediate, but is only as the non-being of otherness (determinate
being reflected into itself).
- "People fancy they are saying something lofty with the
expression 'in itself,' as they do in saying, 'the inner'; but what
something is only in itself, is also only in it."
- "The determination of man is thinking reason; thought in
general; thought as such, in his simple determinateness--by it he
is distiguished from the brute [animal]; in himself he is thought,
in so far as this is also distunguished from his being-for-other, from
his own natural existence and sense-nature through which he is directly
connected with his other. But thought is also in him;
a man himself is thought, he actually exists [is there] as thinking
[madhyamaka???], it is his concrete existence and actuality;
and further, since thought is in his determinate being [dasein] and
determinate being is in thought, it is to be taken as concrete,
as having content and filling; it is thinking reason and as such the
determination of man."(123)
- "'Something' has its determinate being outside (or, as
it is also put, in the inside) of its limit... Limit is the middle
between the two of them in which they cease. They have their
determinate being beyond eachother and beyond their limit; the limit
as the non-being of each is the 'other' of both .
It is in accordance with this difference of Something from its limit
that the line appears as line only outside its limit, the point;
the plane as plane outside the line; the solid as solid outside its
limiting surface. It is primarily this aspect of limit which is
seized by pictoral thought--the externality of the Notion--and especially,
too, in reference to spatial objects." (127)
- "a second definition is given... that the line originates through
the movement of the point."(128)
- "Something with its immanent limit, posited as the contradiction
of itself, through which it is directed and forced out of and beyond
itself, is the finite... they are but the truth of their
being is their end." (129)
- "The thought of the finitude of things brings this sadness
with it because it is qualitative negation pushed to its extreme, and
in the singleness of such determination there is no longer left to things
an affirmative being distinct from their destiny to perish."(129)
- finitude is eternal: "In the first nothing it only occurs; whereas
in finitude it is explicitly stated. There it appears as subjective;
here it is asserted that the finite stands perpetually opposed to the
infinite, that what is in itself null is, and is as in
itself null." [?--nice!]
- Ought [sollen]: "this in-itself, as the negative relation
to its limit, to itself as limitation, is the ought" (132)
- [This is some pretty creative reasoning]
- ought and limit are inseperable
- "Consequently, in this connection we may mention a seemingly
ingenious fancy of Leibnitz: that if a magnet possessed consciousness
it would regard its pointing to the north as a determination of its
will, as a law of its freedom." he continues ..."On the contrary,
if it possessed consciousness and consequently will and freedom..."(135)
- "The infinite in its simple determination is affirmative
as negation of the finite but thus it is in alternating determination
with the finite and is the abstract, one-sided infinite, the sublation
of this infinite and of the finite, as a single process--this is the
true or genuine infinite."(137)
- [I don't think he started back far enough in his contructs]
- "At the name of the infinite, the heart and the mind light up,
for in the infinite the spirit is not merely abstractly present to itself,
but rises to its own self, to the light of its thinking, of its universality,
of its freedom." (137-8)
- "Finitude is only as a transcending of itself; it therefore
contains infinity, the other of itself. Similarly, infinity is
only as a transcending of the finite; it therefore essentially contains
its other and is, consequently, in its own self the other of itself.
The finite is not sublated by the infinite as by a power exisiting outside
it; on the contrary, its infinity consists in sublating its own self."(145-6)
- "Thinkers have often placed the essence of philosophy in the
answering of the question: how does the infinite go forth from itself
and become finite?... The answer, therefore, to the question... is this:
that there is not an infinite which is first of all infinite
and only subsequently has need to become finite, to go forth into finitude;
on the contrary, it is on its own account just as much finite as infinite...
this inseperability is their Notion." (153)
- "The proposition that the finite is ideal [ideell] constitutes
idealism. The idealism of philosophy consists in nothing else
than in recognizing that the finite has no veritable being... Religion
equally does not recognize finitude as a veritable being, as something
ultimate, absolute, or as something underived."(155) [likewise
Buddhism in not unique in claiming "all is illusion"]
- "In being-for-self, qualitative being finds its consummation;
it is infinite being." (157)
- "Since, in finitude the negation has passed into infinity, into
the posited negation of negation, it is simple self-relation and consequently
in its own self the equalization with being, absolutely determined
¶ Being-for-self is first, immediately a being-for-self--the
¶ Secondly, the One passes into a plurality of ones--repulsion--and
this otherness of the ones is sublated in their ideality--attraction.
¶Thirdly, we have the alternating determination of repulsion and
attraction in which they collapse into equilibrium, and quality, which
in being-for-self reached its climax, passes over into quantity"(157)
[the summary of what's to come.
- "Being-for-self has so transcended limitation, its otherness,
that it is, as this negation, the infinite return into itself..
Consciousness, even as such, contains in principle the determination
of being-for-self in that it represents to itself an object
which it senses, or intuits, and so forth; that is, it has within
it the content of the object, which in this manner has an 'ideal'
being... consciousness is only in presence with itself. ...Self-consciousness,
on the other hand, is being-for-self as consummated and posited;
the side of connexion with an other, with an external object, is removed.(158)
- "The one is the simple self-realtion of being-for-self in whcih
its moments have collapsed in themselves and in which, consequently,
being-for-self has the form of immediacy, and its moments therefore
now have a determinate being [remember, moments are as in a particle
system, as in physics points of force, etc.]." (164)
- "In its own self the one simply is; this its being is
neither a determinate being, nor a determinateness as a relation to
an other, nor is it a constitution; what it is, in fact is the accomplished
negation of this circle of categories. Consequently the one is
not capable of becoming an other: it is unalterable." (164)
- one relates loosely with various conceptions of monads...
- "Repulsion is the self-differentiating of the one, at first into
many, whose negative realtionship is without effect because they presuppose
one another as affirmatively present; it is only the ought-to-be of
ideality. In attraction ideality is realized. Repulsion
passes over into attraction; the many into one one." (173)
- "Further, this self-presupposing of the two determinations each
for itself, means that each contains the other as a moment within it.
The self-presupposing as such is the one's positing of itself ina a
one as the negative of itself--repulsion; and what is therein presupposed
is the same as that which presupposes--attraction. That each is
in itself only a moment, is the transition of each out of itself into
the other, the self-negating of each in itself and the self-positing
of each as its own other." (176) [I swear I'm not making this up]
- "Conceived as forces [attraction and repulsion] are [wrongly?]
regarded as self-subsistent and therefore as not connected with each
other through their own nature; that is, they are considered not as
moments, each of which is supposed to pass into the other, but
rather as fixed in their opposition fo each other. Further they
are [wrongly?] imagined as meeting in a third, in matter, but not in
such a manner that this unification is counted as their truth..."(178-9)
- launches into another counter-argument to Kant and...
Here Ends Section one (184?)
(and consequently my reading of this book for a spell)